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ABSTRACT: In this paper we claim that the notion of cognitive representation (and scientific representation in par-
ticular) is irreducibly plural. By means of an analogy with the minimalist conception of truth, we show that 
this pluralism is compatible with a generally deflationary attitude towards representation. We then explore 
the extent and nature of representational pluralism by discussing the positive and negative analogies be-
tween the inferential conception of representation advocated by one of us and the minimalist conception 
of truth. 
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1. The Inferential Conception of Scientific Representation 
In a scientific representation some source A —typically a model, a graph, an equa-
tion— is used to represent some target B —typically a system, entity or phenomenon. 
The inferential conception of scientific representation (Suárez 2004) rejects the view 
that scientific representation is a relation between A and B that answers solely to the 
properties of A and B. Instead representation in science is conceived as an intentional 
activity, which cannot be reduced to any objective relation between the objects that 
stand as sources and targets of the representation, and is best characterised by two 
‘surface’ features: its intentional or representational force and its inferential capacity.  
 The inferential conception takes it that agents’ pragmatic purposes are essential in 
two different ways to the nature of the kind of cognitive representations one finds in 
science: i) as initial fixers of the representational force that points from A to B when A 
represents B, and ii) as defining the level of information, skill and competence re-
quired for an appropriate use of the representation, which in turn determines the infer-
ential capacities of the source —i.e. it determines the inferences about B that can legiti-
mately be carried out on the basis of reasoning about A. The representational force of 
a model within a practice, for instance, is typically initially fixed by stipulation and 
thereafter maintained by convention; the model’s inferential capacities are institution-
ally preserved through the practices of model-building in science. Both are essential 
ingredients of representation, though admittedly they do not cut deep: it is built into 
the notion of a cognitive representation that sources are representationally directed 
towards their targets; and similarly, that they allow or permit the carrying out of infer-
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ences regarding these targets. These two features may then be considered among the 
most basic platitudes regarding cognitive or informative representation.1
 The inferential conception was explicitly linked from the start to ‘a deflationary or 
minimalist attitude and strategy towards the concept of scientific representation in 
analogy to deflationary or minimalist conceptions of truth’ (Suárez 2004, 770). We 
take it that a generally deflationary attitude towards any concept entails, roughly, an at-
tempt at turning its platitudes into the defining conditions for the concept. It conse-
quently involves the withdrawal of any further attempt at a ‘deeper’ or more substan-
tive definition of the concept. This is precisely what the inferential conception invites 
us to do regarding the notion of representation as employed in science. Without pre-
judging the possibility of further platitudes, the inferential conception turns the two 
platitudes mentioned above into necessary conditions on representation, as follows 
(Suárez 2004, 773):  
[inf]: A represents B only if (i) the representational force of A points towards B, and (ii) 
A allows competent and informed agents to draw specific inferences regarding B.  
 [inf] is not intended to capture one unique concept but a plurality of concepts of 
representation, since it leaves open a number of different possibilities for a comple-
tion into further necessary conditions or even necessary and sufficient conditions. 
Thus suppose that a further platitude x is found in the use of the notion of represen-
tation, which we might hope will complete the analytical definition of the concept. 
This can always be added to the set of necessary conditions established by [inf] in the 
following fashion: 
[plural inf]: A represents B if and only if (i) the representational force of A points to-
wards B, (ii) A allows competent and informed agents to draw specific inferences re-
garding B, and (iii) x.  
 First, note that the logical relationship between [inf] and [plural inf] is that the 
former is entailed, but does not entail, the latter. In proposing [plural inf] we are ex-
tending the original proposal into a more general schema which we characterise as ir-
reducibly plural in the following sense. We assume that there are different members of 
[plural inf] with conditions x, y, z, etc, all of them legitimately defining a distinct con-
cept of representation. Hence representation is a word that refers to several distinct 
concepts that share some but not all of its structure. This move turns the original pro-
posal [inf] into a partial specification of the inferential conception of representation, 
which more precisely corresponds to the whole family of members of [plural inf]. We 
find it an advantage of the inferential conception that it allows for the possibility of 
maximal plurality —but it is clear to us that it then becomes imperative to try to locate 
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the core conditions in virtue of which all these concepts fall under the same term. 
That is the job that the original proposal [inf] was designed to fulfil: identifying the 
two conditions that are conceptually necessary (‘platitudinous’) for any instance of sci-
entific representation. 
 There is a particularly simple member of [plural inf] that achieves the logical clo-
sure of [inf] (and hence a full analytical definition of the concept): 
[closed inf]: A represents B if and only if (i) the representational force of A points to-
wards B and (ii) A allows competent and informed agents to draw specific inferences 
regarding B. 
 We are not suggesting to replace the original [inf] with [closed inf], since we con-
sider [closed inf] only one case in a large family of interesting possibilities generated by 
[plural inf]. We are however, particularly keen to explore the features of this member, 
in particular with respect to the analogy with truth previously pointed out, since it 
might be considered the most conservative completion of the inferential conception and 
it restores the integrity of the concept of representation wholesale.2  
 Since we are thus providing a full analytical definition of the concept, it can now 
be questioned to what extent [closed inf] constitutes a deflationary or minimalist con-
ception of representation. The main purpose of this paper is to defend the claim that 
it does. In other words we aim to show that even the simplest, or more conservative, 
member of [plural inf] satisfies the desiderata that we originally set for a generally de-
flationary attitude to representation. 
 We will defend this claim by developing the analogy with Crispin Wright’s mini-
malist conception of truth. This should not be taken to entail support for any specific 
conception of truth, whether substantive or deflationary; in particular, it should not be 
taken as endorsement of Wright’s ‘inflationary’ argument against Horwich’s position 
(Wright 1992, Chapter 1; 2003, 337ff.). We do not need in this paper to defend any 
position on truth, since the issue is tangential to the discussion about cognitive repre-
sentation.3
2. Minimalism and Deflationism about Truth 
According to Wright, deflationism and minimalism share the contention that the con-
ceptual analysis of truth must make essential reference to a couple of basic platitudes 
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or a priori principles, ‘a suitably generalised form of one (or both) of the following 
two schemata’ (Wright 2003, 332): 4
Equivalence Schema for propositions (ES): It is true that P iff P 
Disquotational Scheme for sentences (DS): ‘P’ is true iff P 
 The deflationist argues further that there is nothing substantial left to say about 
truth, both in its conceptual analysis and in its application: the traditional metaphysical 
disputes about the nature of truth (in particular whether truth is reducible to 
correspondence, coherence, justification, etc), are in fact about nothing substantial.  
 The minimalist view, by contrast, while accepting the essential role that (ES) and 
(DS) play in the analysis of the abstract concept of truth, takes it that there are further 
properties of propositions, or sentences, that realise or instantiate concretely this con-
cept of truth. However, according to the minimalist these properties are not the same 
in all cases, and might well vary from domain to domain of discourse. Hence minimal-
ism combines the advantages of deflationism with respect to the concept of truth with 
those of pluralism regarding its application in practice: ‘Minimalism thus incorporates 
a potential pluralism about truth, in the specific sense that what property serves as 
truth may vary from discourse to discourse’ (Wright 2003, 334). 
 It would be a mistake however to identify the crucial distinction between minimal-
ism and deflationism with an exclusive emphasis upon the abstract concept as opposed 
to the concrete property of truth. In other words it would be wrong to characterise this 
disagreement as one about whether truth is an abstract concept. The minimalist ac-
cepts that in every concrete instantiation or realisation of the truth concept some fur-
ther properties will obtain; in other words, that there is no pure, or unmediated, appli-
cation of the abstract concept. Conversely the deflationist can argue that in every ap-
plication of the concept, an additional property is instantiated, namely the trivial prop-
erty of falling under the truth concept.5 Hence both can accept that every legitimate as-
cription of the truth predicate involves both the application of an abstract truth con-
cept and its instantiation via a concrete property of propositions, or sentences.  
 Instead the essential distinction between these two positions is at the point of ap-
plication: for the deflationist the property that instantiates the truth concept is the 
same in each and every application of the concept —and in no case a substantive 
property. For the minimalist by contrast, the properties instantiating truth are many 
and diverse, co-varying with the different domains of discourse. In terminology suited 
to this paper we could say that according to the minimalist truth has many ‘means’ of 
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application, while according to the deflationist it only ever has one ‘means’ —i.e. fal-
ling under the extension of the truth-concept.  
3. The Analogy between Representation and Truth 
Let us now return to the completion of the inferential conception ([closed inf]) that 
we are proposing to explore in this paper. First of all it must be stressed that the point 
of departure of this conception and the minimalist or deflationist theories of truth is 
exactly the same: taking some platitudes as the conditions which constitute the ana-
lytic definition of the abstract concept the theory is dealing with.  
 We begin by emphasising the distinction between the means and the constituents of 
representation (see Suárez 2003 for this distinction, as well as the arguments men-
tioned below). The constituents of representation are the necessary and sufficient con-
ditions that define the concept, while the means of representation are the relations 
between A and B (i.e.: relational properties of A and B), actually employed by scien-
tists in order to infer consequences about B on the basis of reasoning about A. 
Among the most widely used means are similarity (understood as the sharing of prop-
erties between A and B), and isomorphism (between the structures exemplified by A 
and B). The latter is typical in the domain of the mathematical sciences, while the for-
mer accounts for cases of iconic representation in the less quantitative sciences. An 
important part of the background to the inferential conception is the set of arguments 
that show that none of the typical representational means, such as similarity and iso-
morphism, are in fact constituents of representation. This consequently shows that the 
platitudes about representation (‘representational force’ and ‘inferential capacities’) 
cannot be reduced to any of the typical representational means, thus vindicating the 
deflationist attitude that motivates the inferential conception. 
 Nevertheless a weaker relation does hold, namely: all representational means (such 
as isomorphism and similarity) are concrete instantiations, or realisations, of one of 
the basic platitudes that constitute representation, namely ii) inferential capacities. For 
suppose that similarity obtains between A and B. Then A and B have some properties 
{a1, a2, …, an} in common. It follows that anyone sufficiently competent and in-
formed about the representation of B by A can infer on the basis of A that {a1, a2, …, 
an} are instantiated in B. Similarly, suppose that A and B exemplify isomorphic struc-
tures A’ = <D, Pnj > and B’ = <E, Tnj >; where D, E are the domains of objects in 
each structure and Pnj and Tnj are the n-place relations defined in the structure. A’ and 
B’ are isomorphic if and only if there is a one-to-one and onto mapping f: D → E, 
such that for any n-tuple (x1, …, xn) ∈ D: Pnj [x1, …, xn] if and only if Tnj [ f (x1), …, 
f (xn)]. It follows that a competent agent informed about the isomorphism can in prin-
ciple infer that B’ possesses Tnj [f (x1), …, f (xn)] from the observation that A’ pos-
sesses Pnj [x1, …, xn]. 
 Hence every obtaining of similarity or isomorphism between the source and the 
target of a representation is ipso facto an instantiation of part of the abstract concept 
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of representation. And since similarity and isomorphism are distinct relations between 
A and B, appropriate as means of representation in different domains, it follows that 
the realisations of scientific representation, like those of truth according to minimal-
ism, are irreducibly plural.  
 But it remains to be seen if, along the lines of the analogy with minimalism, it is 
also the case that the constituents of representation can only be applied via some 
more concrete means —such as isomorphism and similarity. In other words we may 
ask if it is possible that [closed inf] applies on its own, without simultaneously instanti-
ating some further property, or properties, of A and B. Note how very doubtful this 
sounds. Since part (ii) of [closed inf] states that it must be possible for a competent 
and informed agent to infer some conclusions regarding B (i.e. its properties), on the 
basis of a consideration of A’s properties, there must be some operative rule of infer-
ence (whether or not actively employed by the particular agent) between A’s and B’s 
properties, but such rule would precisely qualify as a concrete means of representa-
tion. Hence, according to [closed inf] there can be no application of representation 
without the simultaneous instantiation of a particular set of properties of A and B, and 
their relation. 
 A similar argument applies to part (i) of [closed inf]. This part states that the repre-
sentational force of the source must point towards the target of the representation; it 
must be noted that [closed inf] leaves open the question of which particular condi-
tions must be met in every concrete instance of representation in order to fix and pre-
serve the representational force of the source. This allows these conditions to vary 
from one domain of representation to another. So, part (i) of [closed inf] expresses a 
generic condition which can only be instantiated if further conditions are met —and 
these further conditions will vary from context to context. But here the analogy with 
the minimalist theory is even stronger since a different analysis of the representational 
force will apply to each whole domain of representation (scientific, artistic, etc) in the 
same way as according to Wright every property that instantiates the abstract concept 
of truth applies throughout a whole domain of discourse. 
 This is the core of the positive analogy between the inferential conception of rep-
resentation in the simplest, or most conservative version [closed inf], and the minimal-
ist conception of truth. In both cases an abstract concept is applied via a variety of 
concrete properties of the objects characteristically falling under the concept (proposi-
tions or sentences in the case of truth, sources and targets in the case of representa-
tion), but which concrete properties co-varies with the domains of application. The 
view similarly combines deflationism regarding the abstract concept with pluralism re-
garding the concrete property that serves to instantiate it.  
 We would like to point out in addition that the analogy brings out a particularly 
welcome feature of the inferential conception in the context of the present-day de-
bates on the nature of scientific representation. Wright employs minimalism to explain 
away the metaphysical debates concerning different theories of truth (as correspon-
dence, coherence, justification, etc). On the minimalist view these theories no longer 
characterise the concept of truth but its properties instead. It is then possible to show 
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that the different theories correspond to different sets of truth-instantiating properties 
in different domains, so every theory can feel vindicated in its own domain of dis-
course (and no theory is vindicated as a universal account of the concept of truth). 
Similarly the inferential conception explains away the quarrels between different theo-
ries of representation; for each theory now describes a different means of representa-
tion, appropriate in different domains (i.e. isomorphism being appropriate in the case 
of the most mathematical dynamical descriptions of nature, similarity appropriate for 
the less quantitative sciences). So these theories aim to characterise the means of rep-
resentation in particular domains of scientific modelling; they do not characterise —
nor should they be understood as trying to characterise— the constituents of repre-
sentation. A long-standing dispute in the field is thereby resolved. 
4. The Limits of the Analogy 
The analogy between representation and minimalist truth is a good heuristic tool to 
explore the properties of the inferential conception, but it is not a perfect analogy. In 
this final section we point out two sources of negative analogy between the inferential 
conception and minimalism about truth. One of them lies precisely at the heart of 
what minimalism and deflationism share in common. Although minimalism and defla-
tionism disagree about the plurality of ‘means’ of application, and specifically about 
whether there is only one or many, the deflationist and the minimalist agree on the 
other hand that there is only one concept of truth. What is debated is how to charac-
terise this concept, and whether it has one or multiple realisations in terms of distinct 
properties, but the fact that there is only one such concept is not under discussion. 
The differences might be captured by means of the following diagram: 
 
 
 Hence minimalism allows for a plurality of concrete properties, but sticks to one 
abstract concept. Here the analogy with the inferential conception in general breaks 
down since [plural inf] allows (but not entails) that there might be a plurality of ab-
stract concepts of representation: [closed inf] is just one of them. In other words the 
inferential conception of representation adheres to the following diagram: 
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 The inferential conception is in this regard better conceived as a research pro-
gramme for the development of alternative, and potentially competitive, notions of 
representation. In each domain of scientific discourse there might be different plati-
tudes that need to be added to define the concept of representation appropriate for 
that domain. This patently finds no analogue in the minimalist conception of truth.  
 A second negative analogy we would like to mention between minimalist truth and 
the inferential conception concerns the possibility of turning these concepts into sec-
ond-order properties. Such a move has already been developed with respect to mini-
malism. Michael Lynch (2001) for instance has developed what he calls alethic func-
tionalism; essentially this is the claim that truth is a second order property of proposi-
tions, or sentences, namely, the property of having a first-order property that plays the 
truth-role. This accommodates the minimalist insight nicely, since it allows us to ac-
count for the plurality of concrete ‘truth’ properties in different domains: coherence 
for juridical science, for instance, correspondence for ordinary factual discourse about 
macroscopic objects perhaps, etc. What these properties share according to the func-
tionalist is not so much their instantiating the same abstract concept of truth, but their 
playing the truth-role in their domain (a role characterised at the very least by the ful-
filment of the platitudes). The generic property of playing the truth-role is thus real-
ised by different properties of propositions, or sentences, in different domains; how-
ever, according to the functionalist, truth is precisely this 2nd order property. 
 The move to a 2nd order property theory of truth is of course controversial and in 
fact changes considerably the nature of the minimalist project. It is not obvious that 
an analogous functionalist theory for representation would satisfy our conditions for a 
deflationary attitude. But the analogy with the inferential conception breaks down at 
this stage anyway, since the latter cannot be considered a 2nd order property of source-
target pairs. For consider what this would entail —roughly that there are particular 
properties of chosen source-target pairs that play the representation-role in each do-
main, and that it is the generic 2nd order property of playing that role (a role character-
ised at least by the platitudes about representation) that constitutes ‘representation’. 
The inferential capacities of the source (part (ii) of [closed inf]) could indeed be taken 
to describe a representation-role across each of the domains (fulfilled by a different 
means of representation in each domain as we have seen). However the problem is 
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that part (i) states that the representational force must flow from the source towards 
the target, and this is not per se a property of the objects that function as source or 
target, nor is it therefore a relation between them. So there is no room here to exploit 
the idea of a 2nd order property of 1st order properties of the objects related, and the 
functionalist theory seems to lack an analogue in the inferential conception. 
5. Conclusions 
We have explored the positive and negative analogy between the inferential concep-
tion of cognitive representation (which we propose to formally represent by [plural 
inf] in general) and the minimalist conception of truth defended by Crispin Wright. 
The analogy is introduced for heuristic purposes, in order to display the kind of plural-
ism that we take cognitive representation to possess. We do not wish to establish any 
deeper theoretical link between representation and truth, and we have already declared 
our neutrality regarding the nature of truth. 
 The point of the positive analogy is to strengthen and to clarify the distinction be-
tween the means and the constituents of representation. The latter are given by the 
platitudes of representation and define the abstract concept, while the former corre-
spond to the set of concrete properties (such as isomorphism, similarity, homology, 
etc) that instantiate the abstract concept —each property being the characteristic form 
of instantiation in its corresponding domain. While the point of the negative analogy 
is, first, to show that the inferential conception admits a plurality (in fact a whole fam-
ily) of abstract concepts of representation —in contrast to minimalism which takes 
truth to be a univocal concept. Second, the attempts to reformulate minimalism as a 
functionalist 2nd order property of truth would seem to lack any possible analogue in 
the case of the inferential conception of representation.  
 To conclude we see this analogy as heuristic reinforcement of the view that the ab-
stract constituents of representation are instantiated, or realised, partly through the 
concrete means of representation. In turn this vindicates the claim that the kinds of 
cognitive representation characteristic of science are abstract relations that obtain in 
practice through isomorphism, similarity, homology, and so on —but which should 
not be identified with any of them. 
 
REFERENCES 
Bailer-Jones, D. M. (2003). “When Scientific Models Represent”, International Studies in the Philosophy of Sci-
ence 17: 59-74. 
Giere, Ronald (1999). Science Without Truth. University of Chicago Press. 
——— (forthcoming). Scientific Perspectives. University of Chicago Press. 
Horwich, Paul (1998). Truth. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Lynch, Michael (2001). “A Functionalist Theory of Truth”, in Michael Lynch (ed.), The Nature of Truth. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Suárez, Mauricio (2003). “Scientific Representation: Against Similarity and Isomorphism”, International 
Studies in the Philosophy of Science 17 (3): 225-244. 
——— (2004). “An Inferential Conception of Scientific Representation”, Philosophy of Science 71: 767-779. 
Mauricio SUÁREZ and Albert SOLÉ 48
Wright, Crispin (1992). Truth and Objectivity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
——— (2003). Saving the Differences. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
 
 
 
Mauricio SUÁREZ is Associate Professor (Profesor Titular) in Logic and Philosophy of Science at Com-
plutense University of Madrid. He previously taught at Oxford, St. Andrews and Bristol Universities, and 
was postdoctoral research fellow at Northwestern University. He holds a BSc in Astrophysics (Edin-
burgh) and PhD in Philosophy of Science (LSE). He has published widely on models and representation 
in science, on dispositions and causality in quantum physics, and on general scientific epistemology. 
ADDRESS: Department of Logic and Philosophy of Science, Faculty of Philosophy, Complutense Univer-
sity, 28040 Madrid, Spain. E-mail: msuarez@filos.ucm.es. 
 
Albert SOLÉ graduated in both Physics and Philosophy from the University of Barcelona. He is currently 
doing his PhD research work in Philosophy of Science at Complutense University of Madrid. His interests 
range from issues in general methodology of science to more particular topics in the philosophy of 
physics, particularly in the foundations of quantum mechanics and Bohm's theory. 
ADDRESS: Department of Logic and Philosophy of Science, Faculty of Philosophy, Complutense Univer-
sity, 28040 Madrid, Spain. E-mail: asole@filos.ucm.es. 
 
